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The Political  Economy  of Public Land Use
B.  Delworth  Gardner
Federal ownership  and management of the public  lands have created  a rent-seeking
frenzy,  inflated rhetoric,  wasted resources,  and squandered  investment opportunities.
The primary  commodity  user groups,  grazers  and timber harvesters,  have  declined
in importance whereas conservationists and recreationists have gained.  Still, historical
use preferences  and continued rent seeking have produced use entitlements that seem
impervious  to  changing costs  and demands  and thus result in large wealth losses  to
consumers  and  taxpayers.  Privatization  of the  public  lands  is  probably  politically
infeasible,  but simulated market processes can be used  to replace political  allocations
and improve  efficiency.
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Introduction
Any  economist,  or  anyone  for  that  matter,  who  believes  that  economic  efficiency  is
important to human  welfare must view government ownership  and management of public
lands  in  the West  with  dismay:  a continuing  saga  of rent-seeking  frenzy,  inflated  and
often malicious  rhetoric,  wasted resources,  and  squandered  opportunities.
Probably no one intended that it be this way. The Progressive vision of expert scientific
management  in vogue  in the  first  quarter of this century  embraced  the  notion that  the
federal lands would be highly productive  in producing  social welfare  if grasping special
interests  could  be  curbed  by  public  servants  trained  in  science.  The  overall  goal  of
management  was  utilitarian:  producing  wood,  water,  and  forage  for  "the  greatest  good
of the greatest number  in the long  run"  (U.S.  Congress,  p.  1).
But now, in 1997, there  is broad disillusionment  with centralized  control of the econ-
omy.  This  is  demonstrated  by  serious  consideration  of privatization  and  devolution  of
many  functions  of government.  Yet,  privatization  of the  public  lands,  and  even  decen-
tralization  of public-land  management,  have  not  been  seriously  considered  (Gardner
1983).
The principal  thesis of this article  is that the  present  situation  is untenable.  The reg-
ulatory  controls  and  allocation  procedures  associated  with federal  ownership  and  man-
agement  are very costly since they  are completely  dissociated from economic  efficiency
criteria and rely instead on the exercise  of political  power.
The  Progressives  worried  that  federal  administration  of the  traditional  uses  of the
public lands could lead eventually to legal rights. This concern is reflected in the language
of enacted  statutes.  For example,  the  authorized  use of federal  forage  by  stockmen  on
the  national  forests  was  not  to  be regarded  as  a  "right,"  but  as  a  "preference"  or  a
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"privilege."  Therefore,  the government  issued revocable  "permits"  to prevent the graz-
ers  from  believing  that  they  had property  rights  which  could  be  protected  by  law.  In
addition,  if these  privileges  bestowed  by  munificent  government  were  not  used,  they
could be  withdrawn.  Thus,  the  "use  it  or lose  it"  doctrine  was  born,  encouraging  inef-
ficient land use and premature development.
But these  attempts to prevent the establishment  of "rights"  did not really work.  What
the  government  chose  to  call  authorized  uses  have,  in  actuality,  evolved  into  de  facto
private  entitlements  now  grounded  in long  historic  experience  that  the  government  is
either unwilling  or unable  to change much.  Since the government managers have neither
incentives  nor price and  cost  information  to  simulate  efficient  market  allocations,  they
have  instead rationed  d resources  by inefficient  political  criteria  (Gardner  1962).  Political
allocations  do  not  shift  use  efficiently  in response  to  changing  demand  and  costs.  As
Nelson  (1995,  p.  198)  has  pointed  out,  "To  move  or  sell  these  de  facto  rights  to  the
highest bidder is like trying to sell someone else's property."  But a lack of exchangeable
de jure  rights  precludes  efficient  economic  markets  from  developing.  The public  lands
are thus used  as  a political  football to  be kicked  around  at the  discretion  of politicians
and bureaucrats  who respond  to the rent  seeking  of special  interests.
The  emergence  of the  environmental  movement  as  a  powerful  new  force  in  public
land management  is  an important factor  in disturbing the political equilibrium  that may
have  existed at midcentury.  The  environmentalists  brought  a  "new moral  vision  and  a
crusading  spirit"  (Nelson  1995,  p. xviii)  that  are reminiscent  of the  Progressive  fervor
so  evident many decades  earlier.  In  sharp contrast to  the progrowth ideology  of the  50s
and  60s,  environmentalists  have  become the  primary  force  to express  doubts  about the
social gains  derived from  economic  growth  and technical  advance.
An  early  statutory  manifestation  of this  new  vision  was  the  1964  Wilderness  Act.
Timber  harvesting,  mechanized  recreation,  and  mining  were  banned  from  designated
wilderness  areas,  and no new livestock grazing or major range improvements were to be
allowed  (Nelson  1995,  p.  72).  Then,  in rapid  succession,  came  the  National  Environ-
mental  Policy  Act  of  1969  (NEPA),  the  Forest  and  Rangeland  Renewable  Resources
Planning  Act of 1974  (NFMA), the Federal  Land Policy  and Management  Act of  1976
(FLPMA),  and  the Public  Rangelands  Improvement  Act of 1978  (PRIA).
Robert  Nelson (1995,  p.  123) convincingly  argues that the planning required by these
statutes
did not create  a rational decision  process  but it did  serve  to redistribute  political power.  Environ-
mental  and recreation  groups  were  able to manipulate  the legal and  procedural handles  created by
planning  to  obtain  greater  influence  over  public  land  decisions.  The  planning  requirements  of
FLPMA  and NFMA  in  this  respect  had practical  consequences  similar  to NEPA.  To  be  sure,  the
land  was  not  literally  conveyed  to  these  groups,  but  in  wilderness  areas,  critical  areas,  wild  and
scenic  rivers,  and  a  host  of  other  new  protective  zones,  recreational  and  environmental  groups
acquired effective  control over future uses. If the control over use is the essence of a property right,
it might  be  said that the  late  twentieth  century witnessed  the  creation  of a whole  set  of private
rights to public  lands.
But these  rights  are seriously  incomplete.  The Austrian  economists,  especially,  have
shown  that market  transfers  of rights promote diversity,  freedom  of choice,  innovation,
and  most  of  all,  harmony.  Market  exchange  by  competent  individuals  permits  people
with  differing  tastes  and  views  to  peacefully  coexist  (Baden  1995).  But  it  is  public
bickering  over  entitlements  and influence  peddling that  characterize  resource  allocation
on the public  lands.
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Political Allocations  and Rent Seeking
The  "public  choice"  school  has provided  the most  compelling  theoretical  rationale for
understanding  political decisions.  Public choice is an effort to apply economic reasoning
to  politics  (Gwartney  and Wagner,  p.  17).  At the  center  of political  bargaining  are  as-
sumed to be rational and  self-interested  agents who  invest in activities available to them
that will increase  their wealth. The  suppliers  of political  favors  (politicians  and  bureau-
crats) provide subsidies,  tax benefits,  and favorable regulations to the demanders  (interest
groups)  in exchange  for votes,  contributions  to political  campaigns,  and job perquisites
(Gardner  1995a,  chapter  7).  Hence,  if interest groups  have  the  constitutional  option of
using  resources  available  to them to buy political  favors,  and if this  activity is expected
to  yield higher returns  than alternative  investments,  they  will engage  in purposeful  col-
lective political action  (Olson).
With respect to the public lands, it is important to recognize that demanders  of favors
cannot purchase  commodities  (services)  directly,  as they would in  an economic market,
although they may pay fees.  The government  is a monopoly supplier, and the demanders
can only increase  their share  by persuading  government,  through rent-seeking  behavior,
to do  so through legislation, bureaucratic  dispositions,  or judicial rulings.
Probably the  most potent  of all public-choice principles  is  "concentrated  benefits  and
diffused  costs."  Political  decisions  can  be more  effectively  manipulated  to  redistribute
wealth  in behalf of an interest  group if the beneficiaries  are relatively  small  in number
and individually  have  a large  stake in the outcome.  Free  riding can be more effectively
controlled  with  a  small  number  of beneficiaries,  so  generating  resources  to  influence
political decision is less costly. On the other hand, those who lose from the redistribution
must be numerous  and individually  have a small  stake. For example,  subsidized  federal
grazing fees have an important impact on the wealth of a relatively few permittees, while
their  costs  are  spread  over  many  millions  of taxpayers  who  allow their  wealth  to  be
confiscated  as long  as the individual  costs of blocking redistributive  policies  are greater
than the amount  of wealth taken.
Another  reason that the concentrated interests of a small group of voters can dominate
a much  larger  group  in the  political arena  is  "rational  ignorance"  (Downs).  Voters  are
assumed to  weigh  the benefits  and  costs of becoming informed about  a particular issue
or a particular  candidate.  If the  expected  costs  exceed the  expected  benefits,  they  will
remain  "ignorant."  Rational  ignorance  explains  why  so  many voters  are  relatively un-
informed.  Thus, they  are easily  "fleeced"  by well-organized  interest  groups which rep-
resent large  wealth positions.
On the other  side of the political  spectrum, politicians  in democracies  bear extremely
high  information  costs.  To  be  effective  representatives,  they  should  know  something
about  a wide  variety  of issues  of concern  to  their  constituents.  It is  not that  they  lack
information;  their offices  are inundated with it, primarily  slanted  toward the interests of
those  who  submit  it.  Hence,  lobbyists  fill  any  vacuum  and  may  even  economize  on
information retrieval  for the politician.  By heeding  the information provided by interest
groups, politicians also increase their chances of getting elected because the bulk of their
campaign financial  support  comes from  these groups.
Capturing  a  wealth  transfer  from  the public  sector through  rent-seeking  investment,
however, may be expensive  where there  is vigorous  competition  for government favors.
Each  competing  interest  group  can be  expected  to pay  something  to  obtain  a  transfer.
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What they pay will depend on the degree of competition by both demanders  and suppliers
of favors  (Gardner  1995a,  Chapter  7).  The  size  of the  transfer  and  the  probability  of
obtaining  it  are significant factors  in accounting  for rent-seeking  expenditures.  Over the
whole  economy,  the expenditure  of scarce  resources to affect the distribution of political
rents  is enormous,  and  there are  few examples  more  visible and  more costly than  deci-
sions that affect  the use of the public  lands.
Economic  rent is the difference  between  what is paid for resources  in their actual use
and  their best  alternative  use.  As  applied  to  users  of resources  from  the  public  lands,
rent may be calculated  as the use value of the product (service)  minus the costs (including
fees paid to  the government) of obtaining  this  use value. For example,  in the case of an
animal unit month (AUM) of federal forage, the economic rent captured by the permittee
would be the value  of the AUM  to the grazer  minus the  sum of the federal fee  and the
nonfee costs of taking the forage.  Ceteris paribus,  the rent per AUM will be higher where
fees  are lower,  forage  is more valuable,  and  auxiliary  costs  are smaller.
Groups Competing for Rents  and Their Relative  Success
The primary groups  contending  for use of the public lands are preservationists  (conser-
vationists),  recreationists,  loggers  and wood processors,  livestock grazers,  miners, water
users,  and  energy  producers.  Although  some  of these  groups  are  competitive,  others
represent interests  that are at least partially complementary.  In addition,  a whole host of
derivative  industries  capture  rents  which  often  have  a  considerable  effect  on  political
outcomes.
Under most  circumstances  the resource-use  interests  of preservationists  are quite dif-
ferent from those of traditional  "commodity"  groups.  In the  1960s,  contention  between
preservationists  and  multiple-use  advocates  escalated  into a heated  debate  over wilder-
ness  vs.  nonwilderess  values.  Ultimately,  this  debate  revealed  two  conflicting  visions
of the character  of modem  society  (Nelson  1995). Baden  (1996b, p. 45) has  argued that
the  protected-area  approach,  coerced  by top-down  government  and  advocated  by pres-
ervationists,  has  "robbed  rural  communities of their  traditional  user-rights over forests,
waters,  fisheries,  and  wildlife,  without offering  appropriate remuneration."  As a  conse-
quence,  many local people  see  conservation  as  anti-development  and  anti-people,  to be
fiercely  resisted.
Over  the past 30  years  a  striking  change  in  federal  land management  policy  is  sug-
gested by the number of acres  said to be managed for "conservation"  purposes. In 1964,
what  was defined  as  conservation  acreage  amounted  to  only  9.4%  of the  federal total,
whereas  in  1994  it was 43.7%  (Eco-logic).  Similarly,  the  wilderness  act  set  aside nine
million  acres  of the  federal  domain  as  wilderness.  By  1994,  the  United  States  Forest
Service  (FS)  and the  Bureau  of Land Management  (BLM)  managed  69.4 million  acres
of wilderness  and conservationist  groups  demand  even more.  Mining is  not allowed on
93.1 million acres;  oil and gas development on 77.3  million acres; hunting on 57 million
acres;  and  grazing  on  20.6 million  acres  not included  in the  wilderness  system.  These
data demonstrate the increasing political muscle of conservation users vis-a-vis traditional
commodity  users.
The shifting  political  power of various  groups may  also be inferred from the  amount
of  acreage  managed  by  the  four  major  federal  land  management  agencies.  Eco-logic
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refers  to  a  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO)  report  which  points  out  that  FS  total
acreage  increased from  186.3 million  acres  in 1964  to  191.6 million in  1994.  Over  the
same  period,  BLM  acreage  fell  from  464.3  million  to  267.1  million  acres.1 Fish  and
Wildlife Service (FWS) acreage  increased from 22.7 million to 87.5 million, and National
Park  Service  (NPS)  acreage  increased  from 27.5  million  to  76.6 million over the  same
period.  Obviously, the big  gainers have been  those  agencies  which  serve conservation,
wildlife,  and recreation interests.
Nor  are  changes  in  public  land  ownership  the  whole  story.  The GAO  reported  that
federal  land managers  are turning  to  leases,  agreements,  and  easements  as  a  means  of
controlling  private  land  that  the  government  does  not want  to  buy.2 Out  of more  than
three million  acres of private property under federal control through these arrangements,
2.1  million  are in conservation  easements,  and  1.7  million  acres  of easements  are ad-
ministered by the FWS  (Eco-logic).
The number of lobbying groups with offices in the nation's capital is a rough indication
of attempts  to  influence  federal  land use  (table Al). All  classes  of interest  groups  are
well represented,  but  registered  environmental  (conservation)  organizations  are  clearly
the most numerous.  The conservation organizations  registered  specifically in the various
public  land states  are also  of interest  (table A2).  As might be  expected, the  number  of
organizations  is largest in the states with the highest population (California, Washington,
Oregon,  and Colorado).  The ecological  variability  of the various  states  is also positively
associated with the number of organizations,  and a relatively large number of recreational
and wildlife groups  are registered  in every  state.
Let us now look briefly  at some of the  large-acreage  user  groups of the federal lands
to see  how they have  fared in recent  times.
Livestock Permittees
AUMs  of federal  grazing  are only  7%  of national  total  grazing,  but about  17%  of the
livestock  in the  11  western  states  graze  some  of the year  on the  public  lands  (Joyce).
The ranching community  claims, however, that these numbers understate the importance
of federal  grazing  to  local  economies.  Since public  lands  are  almost  always  grazed  in
rotation  with  private  lands,  it is  argued  that if public  grazing  had to  be  replaced  with
more  costly feeds,  the viability  of many  existing ranching  operations  would  be  threat-
ened.  While  this view may be valid in  the  short  run, over  time  the land market  would
rearrange resources  into viable ranching units  as it has always  done, but there may well
be fewer of them (Gardner  1995b).
FS,  BLM,  and  total  federal AUMs  since  the mid-1960s  are graphed in  figure  1 as  a
percentage  of their numbers  in  1980.  Total federal grazing  use is  relatively flat,  despite
the views of many scientists that federal ranges are now in the best condition for livestock
grazing than at any other time in this century  (Gardner 1991). This suggests that livestock
permittees  have  not done  well compared  to  some  classes of users  of the  public  lands.
Part  of the  explanation  for the  flat trend  is that  economic  rents  captured  by permittees
1The BLM  decrease of 197.2 million  acres was  produced largely  by a transfer of  113  million acres from BLM to Alaska
and Alaskan natives. The balance  was transferred  to  the other  three agencies.
2 The FWS  reported  that about  1.1  million acres of private  property has been restricted,  mostly for the desert tortoise.  Of
the estimated  187 million acres of wetlands in America,  as much as  165 million acres are privately owned,  and their productive
use remains severely restricted  while owners  are still required  to pay property taxes.
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Figure 1.  AUMs  of grazing  on public lands as  % of 1980,  1966-93
Sources:  The  Grazing  Statistical  Summary,  U.S.  Dept.  of  Agriculture and The Public Lands,  U.S.
Dept.  of the Interior.
are probably  declining.  Many  ranchers  have  simply  given  up their grazing  preferences
rather  than hassle  with  the government  over  what are perceived  as  onerous regulations.
Others  are opting  for temporary  nonuse because  the net value of grazing on some  allot-
ments  is now  not worth  the  fee  (Nielsen,  Godfrey,  and  Lytle).  Still,  there is hope  that
profitability will improve in the future  so permittees  do not have to give up their grazing
altogether  (Gardner  1989).
Another factor  suggesting smaller  rents from public grazing is the declining real price
of substitute private forage over the last three decades  (fig.  2). Because the nominal price
for private  grazing  is  used  in  the  PRIA  formula  for  determining  public  grazing  fees,
rising nominal private fees would have pushed up public fees,  ceteris paribus.3 However,
real  public  fees  are  declining.  This might have  increased  rents  were it not  for the fact
3 The  role  of the  nominal  price  of private  forage  in the  formula  is  to  move  the public  fee  in concert  with  the price  of
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Figure 2.  Nominal and real prices/head  of forage  on comparable  private ranges, 1967-94
Sources:  Torell,  A.  and Statistical Abstract of the  U.S.,  1975-95.
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Figure 3.  Real yearly stumpage  prices in the Pacific Northwest  Region,  1960-92
Sources:  Sohngren,  B.  L. and Haynes,  R.  W.
that  the real  price of alternative  private forage  is also  declining,  meaning  that it  might
be profitable  to  shift to the private  substitute.4
There  are also pressures  on the  suppliers of the  rents, the bureaucrats  and politicians.
The political  importance of budget deficits  is obvious to bureaucrats  and politicians, but
grazing  fees contribute  so little to government  revenues that raising fees or leaving  them
unchanged  would  make  little  difference  to  the  size  of the deficit.  Also,  politicians  en-
counter relentless  pressure, principally from environmentalists,  to remove  livestock from
public  lands  altogether.  Given  the  relatively  few  grazing  permittees,  the  declining  net
economic  rents per  AUM,  the high  rent-seeking  costs  required  to be  competitive  with
other user  groups,  the  "low"  revenues  produced  for the government,  and the pressures
from alternative user groups,  it is not surprising that rancher permittees  have lost ground.
They will probably  continue  to do  so in  the future.
Loggers and Timber Producers
Over  most of the last thirty years,  timber harvesters  have done much better than grazers,
both in the  trends  of value  of harvested  output  and in  revenues  generated  for the  gov-
ernment.  The overall trend in real timber prices  since  1960 is up slightly,  implying some
higher economic rents for timber producers  (fig.  3). However, timber harvests from public
lands have been highly volatile  with substantial  declines in the early  80s, with increases
from  1982 to  1987,  and another rapid  decline  since  1988  (fig.  4).
A reason  for  the  first decline  is the  sharp  recession  and  diminution  of the  inflation
rate  produced  in the early  Reagan  years  by the  monetary policy  of the Federal Reserve
under Paul  Volcker.  The effect  on  timber prices  is revealed  in the  huge decline  in real
stumpage  prices from  1980  to  1985  (fig.  3).  Suppliers  of timber responded  by reducing
their harvests from the national forests and turning instead to their inventories  on private
lands.  The federal  government  uses  a competitive  bidding  policy undergirded  by  mini-
mum appraisal  prices  to allocate federal timber.  Apparently the harvesters were not will-
ing to bid on many parcels  of federal timber during this period of very  low prices.
4One  of the referees  of this  paper makes an important  point.  He/she suggests that livestock  numbers by location over time
suggest  that beef  production  is  shifting from the public land  states to private land states.
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Figure 4.  Harvest of timber from public  lands  1959-92
Sources:  The  Report  of the Forest Service,  U.S.  Dept.  of  Agriculture and Public  Lands  Statistics,
U.S.  Dept.  of the Interior.
The decline  in  the late  1980s  and  1990s  is  attributable  to the  impact of the political
hassles involved with enforcement  of the endangered species  protection act and, notably,
protection of the  spotted owl in  the Pacific Northwest.
The competition  between recreation and  logging is probably  less  severe than between
recreation  and livestock  grazing in  most circumstances.
Recreation  does not necessarily  conflict  with timber  harvesting;  many  game animals,  for example,
require  a diversity  of habitat,  which timber harvesting  can provide  . . . For the bulk of recreation,
however,  especially  ordinary  hiking and  camping, most  recreationists  prefer  uncut  old-growth for-
ests. Almost all recreationists  find the immediate aftermath of clear cutting to be visually unattractive
or worse  (Nelson  1995,  p.  67).
The politics  of public land  timber harvesting  are complicated  because  of diverse  in-
terests and  the relative  size of timber companies operating  mostly on private land. There
can be no question that  as harvests  from the public lands  have declined  in recent years,
small  independent  loggers  and  timber producers  have been  hurt,  as  have  many  rural
communities  dependent on them. (However,  a stable resource flow from the public lands
does not necessarily  guarantee  a  stable  local economy  or community.)  But large timber
companies with extensive private timber holdings have gained because of more favorable
timber  prices  that are partially  attributable  to less  supply  from the public lands.  In fact,
some of the most  vigorous  lobbying  in support  of the endangered  species act  has come
from large  timber  companies.
Fishing, Hunting, and Recreation
From 1967  to  1993 recreation  use of FS and BLM lands  approximately  doubled (fig.  5).
Recreational  visits to the national parks have increased even faster. The prices (fees) paid
by recreational users  are  minimal,  so prices have  not dampened  the quantity  demanded.
Outdoor recreation is a  superior good and  demand rises  as  income increases.  From 1967
to  1991  the  per capita real net national  product rose from  $17,545  to  $22,071  (in  1994
dollars),  or  at  the rate  of about  1%  compounded  annually,  so  some of the  increase  in
outdoor recreation  is  attributable  to income  increases.  Most of the increase  in  demand,
however,  is  probably  due  to  a shift  in  preferences.  Since the  fees  paid by  recreational
users are so small, the consumer surpluses  (economic rents) captured must be very large.
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Figure 5.  Recreation  on public lands 1967-93
Sources:  The Report  of the Forest Service,  U.S.  Dept.  of Agriculture  and Public  Lands  Statistics,
U.S.  Dept.  of the Interior.
Valuing  nonmarket outdoor recreation has always been  a difficult empirical problem, but
at just  $5  per  day,  the  value  of recreation  on  the public  lands  would  have been  $1.5
billion in  1993.
Nelson  argues  that land-use  planning required  of the federal  agencies  by recent  leg-
islation has  served to redistribute  political  power toward recreational  use.
Environmental  and  recreation  groups  were  able  to  manipulate  the  legal  and  procedural  handles
created  by planning  to  obtain greater  influence  over public  land  decisions.  The planning  require-
ments  of FLPMA  and NFMA  in this  respect  had practical  consequences  similar  to NEPA.  To  be
sure,  the land  was  not literally  conveyed  to  these  groups,  but in  wilderness  areas,  critical  areas,
wild  and  scenic  rivers,  and a host  of other  new protective  zones,  recreational  and  environmental
groups  acquired effective  control over future uses  (Nelson  1995,  p.  123).
The nominal or zero fee paid by recreationists  is itself some  indication of the political
power  of this  group.  FLPMA specifically  states  that it is the policy  of the United States
to  receive  fair  market value  of the use of federal  lands  and  their resources  unless  oth-
erwise provided  by  statute:  Small fees  are commonly  collected  for using  campgrounds,
but  no fees  are  charged  for most  other  recreational  activities.  In  1994,  the  FS and  the
BLM  collected less than  $0.05 per recreational  visitor day, while the NPS  collected less
than  $0.25 per  visitor (Godfrey).5 So why do recreationists  pay  so little?  It is not  con-
vincing  to  argue  that  transaction  costs  associated  with  collecting  fees  are  the  reason.
Federal  licenses  could  be  required  similar to  those  used by  the  states  for hunting  and
fishing.6
Since recreational users  of the public lands  tend,  on average,  to have  higher incomes
than  nonusers,  charging  fair-market  fees  as  recommended  by  FLPMA  would  be  both
equitable  and efficient.  However,  given the access to the political system of high-income
5  An  extremely  interesting  set  of issues  involves  shifting of costs  and revenues between  local  and federal  governments.
Increasing use of federal  lands for recreation  is almost always  accompanied  by large  expenditure  increases  by local  govern-
ment.  For  example,  Grand County  officials  in Utah  estimated  that  search and  rescue  expenditures  by  the  Sheriff's Office
increased  from $3,000  in  1985  to more  than $165,000  in  1995  (Godfrey).  Godfrey  further points  out  that  Grand  County
spent $328,000  to provide  services  directly  related  to recreational  activity  in  1994,  most  of it  on  federal lands.  This  was
more  than the total  amount received in the county's  fraction of the federal fees  (payments  in lieu of taxes) collected  in that
year.  Only  a  small  fraction  of the  sales  tax  revenues  associated  with  the  nonlocal  or  nonrural  purchase  of supplies  and
equipment are returned  to rural  communities  where the purchases  are used.
6 Forest economist  Randal  O'Toole has pointed out that a small rise in the recreation fee  to only  $2 per visitor/day  would
make recreation  competitive  with  timber in generating  revenues in nearly every forest region  (O'Toole,  p. 209).
20  July 1997Gardner  The Political  Economy of Public Land Use  21
people,  along with the size of the rents being collected, it would be imprudent to predict
that  "fair"  fees will soon be  forthcoming.
Minerals
Mineral  products  from  the  public  lands  have  been  significant  revenue  producers,  but
revenues  have  declined  significantly  in recent  years.  Besides,  mineral  production  does
not involve large  acreages  of public  lands and  are governed by unique policies.  Further
discussion of these issues  seems beyond the  scope of this  article.
In summary,  this  section  demonstrates  that  trends  in use of the public  lands  suggest
that  traditional  "commodity"  users  (timber,  grazing,  and  minerals)  that  have  been
charged  for  their  uses  have  lost  out  in  the  political  arena  to  those  who  pay  little  or
nothing  (recreationists).  This  strongly  implies that  those  who  capture  the highest rents
have  the most political  clout, the  central tenet of the rent-seeking  hypothesis.
The Significant Efficiency  Costs  of Government Public-Land Management
Economists  have  observed  that  economic  efficiency  plays  only  a minor  role  at best  in
the management  of the federal agencies  (Krutilla  and  Haigh). Marion  Clawson, perhaps
the dean  of forest economists, pointed  out in  1977  that the  FS spends too much money
in timber  management  of low-productivity  sites  and  not  enough  on  sites  of high  pro-
ductivity.  "One  can  only  conclude  that  the  national  forests  have  been  managed  with
virtually no regard for costs  and returns"  (Clawson,  p.  66).
Although  it  may not have  been  the  intent of Congress,  recent  legislation  appears  to
discourage  rigorous  economic  analysis.  The FLPMA  of  1976  directs  that  management
be  on the basis  of multiple  use  and  sustained yield,  while  the PRIA of 1978  dictates  a
policy  to manage,  maintain,  and  improve the condition  of the public rangelands  so that
they become  as  productive  as  feasible for all rangeland  values.  Both imperatives  weigh
heavily  against  management  where  maximum  net  social  benefits  would  be  the  major
goal.
In fact,  political  decisions  will  always  be  influenced  primarily  by  equity rather than
by efficiency  considerations.  Nelson  (U.S.  Congress)  argues that serious economic  anal-
ysis by  federal government  agencies  would serve  as  pressure for a national rather than
a local perspective.  Therefore,  the  reluctance  of the  agencies  to use economics  reflects
a long  tradition  of deference  to  local  equity  concerns.  The  public  land  agencies  have
even justified  the  sustained-yield  dictum partially  as  a means  of promoting  community
stability.  These  agencies  have  done  whatever  was  politically  expedient  to  generate  a
multiple  clientele for obvious political  reasons.
Evidence for Inefficient Management
What evidence  has been brought forward that federal public-land  management  has been
economically  inefficient?
Years ago it was demonstrated how eligibility requirements  for obtaining grazing pref-
erences-politically  necessary  to secure local rancher acquiescence  to regulation of pub-
lic  grazing-have  misallocated  authorized  grazing  among  western  ranchers  (GardnerJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
1962). Leal (1995)  shows that state forest lands are more efficiently managed than federal
lands  because states have  an overriding requirement  to generate revenues from timber to
fund  public  schools  and  county  services,  and  therefore,  local  taxpayers  have  a  vested
interest in superior performance.
The environmental  impact  studies  (EISs)  required  of the BLM  by NEPA provide  an
excellent example of the tremendously costly administrative burden imposed on govern-
ment agencies  by adversarial rent-seeking  competition for political favors.7 Nelson (1995)
has  shown that the  first nine EISs  made  by the BLM  cost  $5.7  million in  direct prepa-
ration costs, or an average of $630,000 per EIS. And the direct costs did not include the
inventories  and  land-use  planning  required  to  lay  the  groundwork.  Indirect costs  were
approximately  10  times greater.8 In fact, Nelson has  estimated that  the cost of each EIS
may well have approached  the total value of the forage  on the allotments  being studied.
This means that the government could have used the EIS funds to buy out all the grazing
privileges  to public  land, leaving  all parties,  including the permittees, better off.
Nelson  (1995)  believes  that  the  total  capital  value  of all  grazing  permits  on  BLM
rangelands  may  not be more than  $1  billion. 9 The total direct rangeland  expenditures  by
the BLM  in  1981  were  on the order of $125  million.  Adding in the overhead  in support
of BLM's direct programs brings the total agency costs for grazing to about $230 million
per year.  The  government  collects  only  about  $15  to  $30  million per  year in  grazing
fees.  Even if livestock grazing  were worth  four times the fees  that the  government  col-
lects,  which  is  not probable  based  on market  permit values,  the  total  annual value  of
grazing  on BLM  lands  would  still  be  only  approximately  $100  million.  This  suggests
that  the  value  of the  resources  being  used up  in  administration  is  substantially  higher
than the grazing  is worth,  not a good  bargain  for taxpayers  and  consumers.'0
Studies  abound  which indicate  that national forest timber revenues  do not come close
to covering  costs  of sales, except possibly for regions  in the Pacific Northwest.  In  1980,
Assistant  Secretary  of Agriculture  Rupert  Cutler reported  FS calculations  that showed
that  almost  22%  of the  volume  of timber  harvested  in  1978  did  not  generate  enough
public  revenues  to  cover  public  cost  (Nelson  1995).  Because  agency  responsibilities
mandated  by  Congress  may  be  highly  complex,  comparing  agency  costs  and  revenues
for a given activity,  such as  timber harvesting, may be somewhat  misleading.  But where
a large disparity exists  at least a question can be raised about whether the activity meets
economic  efficiency  criteria.
Dr.  William  Hyde  showed  that  a  1976  proposal  to  harvest  timber  in  the  San  Juan
National Forest in Colorado generated revenues of $2.65 per thousand board feet whereas
it would have  required  $38.70  to  cover the  cost of the  sale. Hyde  concluded  that  sales
in roadless  areas would rarely,  if ever, justify their costs.
In 1980, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) compared receipts with costs
of timber harvesting  for  each national  forest  during  the  period  1974-78,  when  timber
7 One  range scientist,  Boysie Day, considered the EISs to be  "pure busywork carried out in the name of decision making,
but serving  only  to divert energy, attention  and effort  from management  functions  to useless paperwork"  (Nelson  1995,  p.
111).
8 By 1980,  BLM expenditures  on rangeland inventories  alone equaled $26.1  million,  more than the total revenues collected
from grazing  fees (Nelson  1995,  p.  109).
9  My  own estimate  (Gardner  1995,  p.  79) of the rancher  wealth  tied up in BLM  grazing  permits is $2.2 billion.
'
1 The Interior Department reports that  from 1975  to  1977 funding  for on-the-ground  capital improvements  declined  from
$8.3  million to $5.8  million per year, while  "paperwork"  expenditures  for inventory,  planning,  and EIS  writing rose  sharply
from $3 million to  $13  million (Nelson  1995,  p.  108).
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prices were relatively  favorable.  If expenses for reforestation, timber stand improvement,
timber  sale  preparation,  administration,  and road  building are included  into the calcula-
tion  of total  costs,  then  73  of the  118  national  forests  spent  more  than  they collected
(O'Toole,  p.  29).  When only half of the road costs  were counted,  66 forests lost money
(Barlow et al.).
The most  extreme  example  of  "deficit  harvesting"  seems to  be on  the Tongass  Na-
tional Forest in  Alaska. FS data  show that  each dollar expended  on federal timber  sales
in  1983  returned  merely  two  cents  in  timber  sales  receipts  (Emerson,  Stout,  and
Kloepfer.)  In  1980  Congress  enacted  the Alaska  National  Interest  Lands  Conservation
Act which  set a  goal  of supplying  4.5  billion board  feet  of timber per decade  to  "de-
pendent  industry."  This  act  is  the  only  example  of Congress  specifically  mandating  a
timber  sales  goal  for a national  forest.  As  a  result,  the  16.8-million-acre  Tongass  sells
below-cost  timber  to  create  employment  for  the  60,000  residents  of the  area.  The  act
also provides  an open-ended  appropriation  of at least $40 million  annually or  as  much
as  the secretary  of agriculture  finds  is  necessary.  A timber appraisal done in  1982  con-
cluded that  potential  government  losses between  1959  and  1980  ranged  from  $76.5 to
$81.5  million  (Emerson  and  Turnage).
The highest economic  use of national forests increasingly  lies  in recreation rather than
commodity  production.  In  the  Gallatin  National  Forest  it  costs  taxpayers  $50,000  per
year to maintain a single timber-related  job (Baden and Geddes).  The recreation industry
directly  employs  1,200 people in that forest, while the timber industry employs only 50.
By  requiring  the  FS to  sell timber  at far below  its true  costs, Congress  undermines  the
region's  natural  transition from a commodity-based  to  a  service-  and information-based
economy.
The potential for shifting  resource allocation  to more efficient uses on the public lands
through  markets  seems  almost limitless.  What if environmental  groups  could  compete
with grazers  and timber  producers  for use of federal lands?  The FS recently  offered for
sale 275  acres of scorched or burned trees in a remote pocket of the Thunder Mountains
in the Okanogan  National Forest  (Baden  1996b).  It spent $200,000  to plan the sale, and
ultimately two wood-product  firms placed bids. However,  they were outbid by the North-
west Ecosystem  Alliance  (NWEA),  an  environmental  group.  While  this  appears  to  be
the  first  time  an  environmental  organization  has  outbid  timber  companies  for logging
rights,  this might  have  been  their first opportunity  to bid  at all.  In  any  case, the  FS  is
likely to reject NWEA's  bid because the Alliance wants to let the trees stand to complete
a  100-year  cycle.  The  federal  regulations  mandate  that  purchasers  be  responsible  for
cutting  the trees,  and the FS says it will disqualify purchasers who lack such "integrity"
and  "ethics."
What Can Be  Done  Now?
Given  the  evidence  presented  for  inefficient resource  allocation  under federal manage-
ment,  a  strong  case  can be  made  for privatizing  the bulk of the public  lands  (Gardner
1983).  However,  it is  doubtful  that  such can be  accomplished  politically.  The obstacles
are formidable:  first, the  lack  of a viable  constituency  able to  mount  an effective  cam-
paign among the gainers (taxpayers  and consumers) because of diffused costs and rational
ignorance;  and second,  the concentrated  power of groups which have an interest in main-
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taining the  status  quo.  In  addition,  the  problems  of transition  to  privatization  and/or to
state  ownership  and control  are not  adequately  understood.  Nelson (1995)  believes  that
privatization  recommendations  have failed to recognize  that the public lands  are already
privatized  to  a  greater degree  than either the proponents  or opponents  acknowledge.  As
Nelson (1995,  p.  343)  puts it, the  designation  of
timber  harvest  areas,  wilderness  areas,  coal  mining  areas,  conservation  areas,  wild  horse  areas,
critical  environmental  areas,  and  various  other  special  categories  of  public  lands  are  gradually
establishing  a zoning  system on the public lands.  And much  like urban  zoning of private  land, the
long-run  trend  of public  land  zoning  is toward  a system  of collective  private  rights  to use  these
areas of public  lands.
Nelson is right only up to a point. None  of the users of public lands  obtain fee simple
title, but user groups are receiving use entitlements through the planning process. Because
these entitlements  are not private rights,  they cannot be traded to  achieve more  efficient
resource  allocation  when  demand shifts.  But this  is exactly what is  so urgently needed.
Nor  does devolution  of the public  lands  to  state  ownership  and  management  appear
likely, despite  movement  in  this direction  on other fronts  such as  the proposal  for com-
bining,  under  state  control,  federal  and  state  water projects  in  California.  The primary
reason  is  skepticism  that  states  can be  efficient  in  administering  these  lands.  Political
opportunism  by interest groups is potentially just as likely at the state level as the national
level.  State  governors,  legislators,  bureaucrats,  and local politicians  would be vulnerable
to  the  same rent-seeking  abuses  that now  afflict federal managers  and politicians.  What
evidence  exists  that  there  would  be  less  corruption  at the  local  level,  given  the  sorry
record  that local decision  makers have  in land-use  planning,  zoning,  and  similar activi-
ties?
Clearly,  however,  even if ownership  and management  remain in federal hands,  market
processes could be used to a greater extent than  at present to provide access to resources.
What is most desperately needed in public land administration  is the flexibility to change
uses  at the margin  as demand  shifts,  rather  than locking  in a permanent  use entitlement
for every interest group that makes demands  on the government.  Providing  a climate for
economically  feasible  investment  is also  important.  It is  difficult to  see  how either  can
emerge  without  the creation of "real"  rights that  are transferable  and unrestricted  as  to
who  is eligible  to hold them.
In  the  case  of grazing  allotments,  this might  consist  of permanent  rights  issued  to
current  permittees  who  could  then  sell  them  without  restriction  to  the  highest  bidder
(Gardner  1963).  It  is probable  that environmental  and recreation  groups would be inter-
ested  in only a fraction  of these rangeland  rights  (Nelson  1996).  It is also  conceivable
that  an environmental  or recreational  group might purchase  these forage rights  and  then
sublease  them to  a livestock operator  willing to  abide by certain  conditions.
The potential importance  for public-land management  of recent political trends  should
not be  overlooked.  The  election of conservative  Republicans  to  Congress in  1994,  and
continued  in  1996,  could have  some interesting  impacts.  These conservatives  are likely
to be more hostile to  subsidies, but at the same time may give greater autonomy to users
in  managing  resources.  Legislation  has  been  considered  that  would  compensate  land-
owners for "takings"  associated  with the enforcement of the endangered species act and
wetlands  designations.  If enacted,  agency  officials  should  be  less  aggressive  in taking
private  property  for social  purposes.  But,  for reasons  advanced  earlier, it  is  still a long
stretch  to  believe  that  the  production  of primary  commodities  such  as  forage,  timber,
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energy,  and  minerals  on the  public  lands  will  ever  again  match  their former  levels  as
long as the  land remains  under public  ownership.
[Received August 1996; final version received January 1997.]
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Appendix:  Table 1A.  Organizations with  Interests in Public  Lands Having Offices  in
Washington,  D.C.
Mining:
American  Mining  Congress
Mineralogical  Society of America
Salt Institute
American  Zinc Assn.
American  Iron and  Steel Institute
National Ocean  Industries  Assn.  (Continental
shelf)
National Mining  Association
Water:
American  Rivers
American  Water  Resources Assn.
Environmental  Defense  Fund
National  Assn.  of Regulatory Utility  Commis-
sioners
National  Association of Water  Companies
National  Water Resources  Assn.
Water  Resources Congress
Recreation:
American  Resort  Development  Assn.
National  Inholders Assn./Multiple  Use Land  Alli-
ance
Land  Trust Alliance
Scenic America
American  Hiking  Society
American Recreation  Coalition
Nation Recreation  and Park  Assn.
Environmental:
Friends  of the Earth
Izaak  Walton  League  of America
National  Assn. of Conservation  Districts
National  Audubon Society
National  Wildlife Federation
Natural  Resources Defense  Council
The Nature  Conservancy
Renewable  Natural Resources  Foundation
Resources  for the Future
Sierra  Club
Wilderness  Society
U.S.  Chamber  of Commerce
Wildlife Management  Institute
World Resources  Institute
World Wildlife Fund
American  Fisheries  Society




Defenders  of Wildlife
Grazing:
National  Cattlemen Association
U.S.  Meat Export Federation
National Livestock  and Meat  Board
Beef Industry Council
Cattlemen Beef Promotion  and Research Board
American  Meat Institute
American  Sheep  Industry  Assn.
Animal Health Institute
National  Assn.  of Meat  Purveyors
National  Meat Canners  Assn.
Public  Lands Council
Timber:
American  Forests  and Paper Association
International  Paper
Society  of American  Foresters
Builders  Trade  Association
American  Forest Council
American  Hardwood  Export Council
American  Pulpwood Association
American  Wood  Preservers Institute
National Lumber  and Building  Material  Dealers
Assn.
Save America's  Forests
Source:  Overdahl,  J. A.
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Arizona Association  of Conservation Districts
Arizona Bass Chapter  Federation
Arizona Conservation  Council
The  Rincon Institute
Trout Unlimited Arizona Council
Wildlife  Society Arizona Chapter
California:
American Fisheries  Society,  California-Nevada
Chapt.
American  Fisheries  Society, Humboldt Chapter
Association for Environmental  and Outdoor Edu-
cation
California Assn.  of Resource  Conservation  Dis-
tricts
California Bass Chapter Federation
The California Native Plant Society
California Trappers  Association
California Trout,  Inc.
California Waterfowl  Association
California Wildlife Defenders
California Wildlife Federation
Californians for Population  Stabilization
Citizens  for a Better Environment
Council  for Planning  and Conservation
Environmental  Defense  Center, Inc.
Forest Landowners of America
Izaak Walton  League of America,  Inc.
Marin Conservation  League
Mount  Shasta Area Audubon  Society
Northcoast Environment  Center
Planning  and  Conservation League
Stanford Environmental  Law Society
Trout Unlimited California Council
Wildlife  Society California Central  Coast Chapter
Wildlife  Society Humboldt Chapter
Wildlife  Society Sacramento  Chapter
Wildlife  Society San Francisco  Bay Area Chapter
Wildlife  Society San Joaquin Valley  Chapter
Wildlife  Society Southern  California  Chapter
Idaho:
Idaho Wildlife Federation
American  Fisheries  Society,  Idaho  Chapter
Idaho  Bass chapter  Federation
Idaho  Conservation League
Idaho  Environmental  Council
Idaho  Forest Owners  Association
Idaho  Trappers  Association
Trout Unlimited Idaho  Council




Friends of Discovery  Park
Hood Canal Land Trust
Inland Northwest Wildlife Council
League  of Women Voters of Washington
The Mountaineers
Olympic  Park Associates
Olympic  Wildlife Rescue
The San Juan  Preservation Trust
Trout  Unlimited Washington Council
Washington  Association  of Conservation Districts
Washington  Bass Chapter Federation
Washington Environmental  Council
Washington  Farm Forestry  Association
Washington  Foundation for the Environment
Washington Native  Plant Society
Washington Recreation  and Park Association
Washington  Society of American  Foresters
Washington  State Forestry Conference
Washington  Trails Association
Washington  Wildlife Heritage Foundation
Washington  Wildlife and Recreation  Coalition
Washington  Society Washington  Chapter
Montana:
Montana  Wildlife Federation
Confederated Salsih and Kootenai  Tribes
Montana Association  of Conservation Districts
Montana Audubon Council
Montana Bass Chapter  Federation
Montana Environmental  Information Center
Montana Forest Owners Association
Montana Land Reliance
Montana Wilderness  Association
Trout Unlimited  Montana Council
Wildlife Society Montana  Chapter
New  Mexico:
New Mexico  Wildlife Federation
American  Fisheries  Society, New Mexico  State
University  Student  Chapter
The Forest Trust
New Mexico  Association  of Conservation Dis-
tricts
New Mexico Bass  Chapter Federation
New Mexico Environmental  Law Center
Trout Unlimited Rio Grande  Chapter
Wildlife Society New Mexico  Chapter
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Colorado:
Colorado  Wildlife Federation
American  Fisheries  Society,  Colorado-Wyoming
Chapt.
Colorado  Bass Chapter Federation
Colorado  Environmental  Coalition,  Inc.
Colorado Forestry Association
Colorado  Trappers Association
Colorado  Water Congress
Colorado  Wildlife  Heritage Foundation
Izaak  Walton  League  of America, Inc.
The Nature  Conservancy  of Colorado
Rocky  Mountain  Bighorn Society
Sinapu
Trout  Unlimited Colorado  Council
Wildlife  Society Colorado  Chapter
Wyoming:
Wyoming Wildlife Federation
Izaak Walton League  of America,  Inc.
Powder River Basin Resource  Council
Trout  Unlimited Wyoming
Wildlife  Society Wyoming Chapter
Wyoming  Association of Conservation  Districts
Wyoming  Bass Chapter Federation
Wyoming  Native Plant Society
Wyoming  Outdoor Council
Oregon:
Oregon Wildlife Federation
American  Fisheries  Society,  Oregon  Chapter
American  Fisheries  Society,  Portland  Chapter
Audubon  Society of Portland
Izaak Walton  League  of America,  Inc.
Oregon Association  of Conservation  Districts
Oregon Bass Chapter  Federation
Oregon Environmental  Council,  Inc.
Oregon Natural Resources  Council
Oregon Small Woodlands  Association
Oregon Society of American  Foresters
Oregon  Trout,  Inc.
Oregon Wildlife Heritage Foundation
Trout  Unlimited  Oregon Council
Wildlife  Society Oregon Chapter
Utah:
Utah Wildlife Federation
American  Fisheries  Society,  Bonneville  Chapter
Southern  Utah Wilderness  Alliance
Trout Unlimited Utah  Council
Utah Bass Chapter Federation
Utah Nature  Study Society
Utah Wilderness  Association
Utah  Wilderness  Coalition
Wasatch  Mountain  Club
Wildlife  Society Utah Chapter
Nevada:
Nevada  Association  of Conservation Districts
Wildlife Society Nevada  Chapter
Source:  Conservation Directory.
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